International commodity agreements (IIs) are essentially multilateral instruments of state control that support the international price of certain primary raw materials, notably through agreements such as export quotas or guaranteed market access. As a result, international commodity agreements must be distinguished from commodity study groups that lack fully operational responsibility; international non-governmental cartels; and the Combined Food Board (1942-1945) or the International Materials Conference (1951-1953), which involved international allocentric machines for a considerable number of primary raw materials in times of war-induced shortage. The proposed definition also excludes “close” forms of international commitments: (1) bilateral mass purchase agreements; (2) multilateral market control agreements for industrial products, such as the international cotton textile agreement negotiated in 1961; (3) sectoral integration schemes modelled on the European Coal and Steel Community or the European Economic Community`s Common Agricultural Policy; (4) plans for a commodity reserve currency; (5) proposals for international food reserves; and (6) measures to reduce tariffs or non-tariff restrictions on international trade in goods or services. International agreements on raw materials, in their modern form, can be dated to the Brussels Sugar Convention (1902), under which the major modern sugar exporters pledged to support the international market by abandoning national export subsidy systems. The most important agreement of the 1920s was the Stevenson Rubber Scheme, implemented by the British and Dutch authorities on behalf of their respective colonial territories in Malaya and the Netherlands, East India. This regime, which led to a sharp but ephemeral price increase (Whittlesey in 1931), was frankly restrictive and the experience under it was the main reason for certain protective measures introduced in Chapter 5 of the Havana Charter for an international trade organization (United Nations in 1947). Historically, U.S. policy on international commodity agreements has been marked by some ambivalence. Until recently, it has only participated in agreements that are of interest to the United States, particularly the international wheat agreement. Even in the case of sugar (where the United States remains a net importer), it has acted more in a producer than among consumers; Too large a gap between domestic and foreign prices would embarrass the continuation of the national sugar control system. From time to time, the United States has co-ordded the idea of a lead and zinc agreement to end an existing system of unilaterally imposed import quotas, which has caused great irritation in trade relations with Mexico, Peru, Australia and Canada. (1) Inelastic request.
If narrow substitutes are available, it is certain that market-priced assistance for individual products will have immediate and very detrimental effects.